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Abstract. Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) is a reactive routing protocols used popu-
larly in Mobile Ad hoc Network. AODV is target of many Denial of Service (DoS) attack types, such
as Blackhole/ Sinkhole, Grayhole, Flooding and Whirlwind. There are some published researches
to improvement AODV for security goal using digital signature, for example, SAODV and ARAN.
However, they have some weakness that a malicious node can attack SAODV by using fake keys
and both of SAODV and ARAN routing protocols can not detect wormhole nodes under hide mode.
This article proposes a Trust Authentication Mechanisms (TAM) which uses public-key cryptogra-
phy RSA and digital certificates (DC) based on X509 standard. TAM allows an intermediate node
authenticates a preceding nodes by checking all control route packets through 3 steps: (1) Digital
certificates; (2) actual neighbors; and (3) packet integrity authentications. The simulation results in
NS2 show that TAM can successfully detect and prevent to 100% malicious nodes using fake keys
and above 99% (the mistaken rate below 1.0%) wormhole nodes under hide mode for all mobility
scenarios where there are nodes move with 30m/s maximum speeds and variable tunnel lengths.
Keywords. AODV; MANET; TAM; TAMAN; network security; trust authentication mechanisms.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET [5]) is a wireless network connecting mobile devices. In
MANET, nodes are able to move freely to any direction and cooperate to forward packets to
each other to reach destination beyond source nodes transmission range. MANET is a peer-
to-peer network, in which every node plays the same role as a host and also a router. The
MANET topology changes frequently because of nodes exiting or joining. MANET is often
deployed in places with no infrastructure, in instable environment or in emergency situations
such as: disaster rescue, urgent conference and communication in military mission. There
are many routing protocols in MANET, they are classified as proactive, reactive and hybrid
protocol [3]. Proactive routing protocols are suitable for fixed network topology because
nodes need to establish transmission links before routing. On the other hand, mobility
network topology will be appropriate with reactive routing protocols, nodes find a new route
if needed by broadcasting routing request packets and receiving routing reply packets, such
as AODV [18], DSR (Dynamic Source Routing [8]). In mixed network environment, hybrid
routing protocols are highly sufficient. However, almost routing protocols were designed
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with assumption that MANET is a trusted network including friendly nodes, so that hacker
easily exploits to make many network attack types [19]. AODV reactive routing protocol is
target of many DoS attack types, for examples: Blackhole [22], Sinkhole [21], Grayhole [4],
Wormhole [10, 16], Flooding [24, 27] and Whirlwind [17], all listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Summarized attack types [17]; (•) Implement (◦) Optional
Features
Attack types
Blackhole Grayhole Wormhole Flooding Whirlwind
Purpose
Dropping • • ◦ • •
Eavesdropping •
Localtion
External • • • •
Internal •
Form
Active • • • • •
Passive ◦
Lost packets
Malicious nodes • • • •
Over time-life •
There are many published researches related to detection and prevention of DoS attack
types in MANET. Detection solutions have low cost, but they are based on characteristics of
attack types to detect, hence, they only bring about efficiency to independent type of attack,
malicious nodes can pass the security wall by deliberately giving fake information concerning.
Prevention solutions use digital signature or one-way hash, such as SAODV, ARAN. They
have the advantages of high security and preventing attacks of many types. However, because
SAODV does not have a mechanism for authenticating preceding nodes, malicious nodes can
easily join a path and launch various malicious attacks. And SAODV does not have a public
key management mechanism, malicious nodes can easily join a route by using fake keys.
ARAN has supplemented a public key management mechanism, improved SAODV weakness.
Both of SAODV and ARAN are failed by wormhole attacks in hide mode (HM). Causing
malicious nodes are hidden from normal nodes in hide mode, when receive packets and simply
forward them to each other without process packet, thus, packets information is not changed
after it is forwarded by malicious nodes [7, 14]. This article proposes the trust authentication
mechanisms named TAM based on the RSA [2] public key encryption and hash function
SHA1 [9]. In the discovery route process, all preceding nodes are authenticated through three
levels: Digital certificates, actual neighbors and packet integrity authentications. Analysis
results confirm that TAM can detect and prevent all impersonation attacks types, such as
Blackhole/ Sinkhole, Grayhole, Flooding, Whirlwind and Wormhole attacks in participation
mode (PM). In addition, the digital certificates authentication mechanisms allow to detect
and prevent the malicious nodes joining the network with the fake keys. Especially, the
actual neighbors authentication mechanisms detect the wormhole attacks in HM mode. We
make a new improved protocol called TAMAN by integrating TAM into AODV protocol
which can prevent all types of current attacks as described in Table 1.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 shows research works
published related to detection and prevention of the routing protocol attacks; Section 3
shows the mechanism to manage digital certificates and algorithm authenticates preceding
node when a node receives the control route packets; Section 4 shows the analysis results
and comparing on related works and our approach; Finally, conclusions and future works.
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2. RELATED WORKS
Some research works published related to detection routing protocol attacks in Mobile
Ad hoc Network. The first, for Blackhole detection case, authors [22] described the Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) has ability to recognize Backhole attack in DSR routing protocol.
The IDS is set in node in order to perform the so-called ABM (Anti-Blackhole Mechanism)
function, which is mainly used to estimate a suspicious value of a node according to the
abnormal difference between the routing messages transmitted from the node. When a sus-
picious value exceeds a threshold, an IDS nearby will broadcast a block message, informing
all nodes on the network, asking them to cooperatively isolate the malicious node. The sec-
ond, to detect and isolate Grayhole attacks, authors [25] proposed to use aggregate signature
algorithm to produce evidence on forwarded packets and to trace malicious nodes by using
these evidence. In addition, authors [10] presented a new robust wormhole detection algo-
rithm based on Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA) for the AODV routing
protocol. TTHCA provides wormhole detection performance with low mistake rates, without
incurring either significant computational or network cost. However, the TTHCA detection
ability to malicious nodes is restricted because the round-trip time of packet is influenced in
the mobile topology at high speed. Furthermore, authors [16] proposed VRTM for security
and a new improved routing protocol named DWAODV by integrating VRTM into AODV
protocol. VRTM use the distance and HC metrics to detect wormhole attacks, thus VRTM
has proven the effective with low measurement mistakes in the high mobility network topol-
ogy under attacks. The simulation results show that VRTM detects successfully over 99%
of invalid routes, and small dependence on tunnel length. However, important problem for
the VRTM algorithm is to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the control packet. It is
feasible that a PM mode wormhole node can deliberately give fake information concerning
for GPS and Path length fields. Finally, authors [27] presented flooding attack prevention
(FAP) schema that it can prevent the Flooding Attacks with little overhead. When the
malicious nodes broadcast very great route request packets, the neighbor nodes of the ma-
licious observe a high rate of route request and then they lower the corresponding priority
according to the rate of incoming queries. In addition, not serviced low priority queries are
eventually discarded. When the malicious nodes send many attacking DATA packets to the
victim node, the normal node may cut off the path and does not set up a path to malicious
node.
Another approach to increase security level for routing protocols based on mechanisms
of authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation based on digital signature (DS) or one-way
hash. The first, SAODV [13] is improved from AODV by Zapata to prevent impersonation at-
tacks by changing hop-count (HC) and sequence number (SN) values of route control packets.
However, SAODV only supports an end-to-end authentication mechanism, an intermediate
nodes can’t certify packet coming from a preceding node. Hence, malicious nodes can easily
join a path and launch various malicious attacks [26]. Moreover, because SAODV does not
have a public key management mechanism, malicious nodes can easily join a route by using
fake keys. The second, Sanzgiri also recommended ARAN [20] protocol. Differently from
SAODV, route discovery packet RDP in ARAN is signed and certified at all nodes. ARAN
has supplemented the testing member node mechanism, thus, malicious nodes can not pass
over security by using fake keys. Structure of RDP and REP of ARAN is not available with
HC to identify routing cost; this means ARAN is unable to recognize transmission expenses
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to the destination. Accordingly, ARAN protocol does not guarantee a shortest route, but
offers a quickest path which is chosen by the RDP that reaches the destination node first.
Both of SAODV and ARAN are failed by Wormhole attacks in hide mode. Causing mali-
cious nodes are hidden from normal nodes in HM mode, when receiving packets and simply
forwards them to each other without processing packet, thus, packets information is not
changed after it is forwarded by malicious nodes [7, 14]. In addition, authors [12] proposed
SEAR based on the ideal of AODV which use a one-way hash function to build up a hash set
of value attached with each node and is used to certify route discovery packages. In SEAR,
Identification of each node is encoded with SN and HC values; hence, it prevents iterative
route attacks. Finally, authors [14] presented a secure efficient ad-hoc on demand rout-
ing protocol (SEAODV) for MANETs networks. It uses HEAP authentication scheme with
symmetric cryptography and one-way hash function for protection of route control packets.
By simulation, SEAODV has better security with less overhead than other existing secure
AODV protocols, such as SAODV, ARAN and SEAR.
3. TRUST AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS FOR MANET (TAMAN)
This section describes the trust authentication mechanisms and steps to authenticate the
preceding nodes. In addition, upgrading AODV protocol to TAMAN security protocol will
be presented in this section. Set of symbols in Table 2 are applied for the presentation.
Table 2. Description of symbols
Variable Descriptions
DCNδ Digital Certificate of node Nδ
Nδ Node labeled δ
De(v, k) Decryption v value using key k (described in Figure 13(b))
En(v, k) Encryption v value using key k (described in Figure 13(a))
GPSNδ Nδ location using Global Positioning System
H(v) v is hashed by hash function H
IPNδ Address of node Nδ
RNδ Radio range of node Nδ
kNδ+, kNδ - Keys of node Nδ
3.1. Trust Authentication Mechanisms (TAM)
TAM supports a mobile node which authenticate a preceding node through checking
the received route control packets (RREQ or RREP) including digital certificates, actual
neighbors and packet integrity authentications, as description in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Trust Authentication Mechanisms, BH: Blackhole, SH: Sinkhole, GH: Grayhole,
WH: Wormhole, FD: Flooding and WW: Whirlwind
3.1.1. Digital certificates authentication
The proposed solution also assumes that for a node to participate in the route discovery
process it has to be certified and its certificate can be verified by any other node with
the proposed procedure. Thus, it prevents malicious nodes that joined the route by giving
intentional fake information, such as: Blackhole, Sinkhole, Grayhole, Flooding, Whirlwind,
and PM Wormhole attacks. We use a reliable node named NCA to manage and provide
the Digital Certificates for all nodes. In this article, DC is installed for all nodes manually,
providing the DC for all nodes automatically through the DCP and DCACK packets will be
described and evaluated in the future research.
a) Digital certificates. Digital certificate is used to certify the identities of nodes in MANET,
it is provided for node automatically from certificate authorities (CA) before nodes collabo-
rate to the discovery route process. TAM uses digital certificates based on X.509 template
as description in Figure 2.
1. Version
2. Serial Number
3. Signature Algorithm
4. Issuer Name
5. Validity Period
6. Subject Name
7. Public Key (PK)
8. Certificate Signature (CS)
Figure 2. DC structure based on X.509 Certificate [15]
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Where, (1) Version of the certificate; (2) The unique serial number that is assigned by
the issuing CA; (3) The public key cryptography and algorithms that are used by the CA to
sign the certificate; (4) The name of the issuing CA; (5) The certificate’s start and expiration
dates; (6) The name of the subject of the certificate; (7) The public key of the subject of the
certificate; (8) The CA’s digital signature, which is created as the last step in generating the
certificate by encrypting the hash value of all X.509 certificates attributes with CA private
keys
CS ← En(H(DC.AllF ields\{CS}), kNCA−). (1)
b) Digital certificate management. We setup a reliable node named NCA acting as certificate
authorities to manage and provide DC for all member nodes. In NCA exists a Digital
Certificate Database (DCDB) of all nodes with the structure as description in Table 3.
Each record in DCDB consists of: Address of node (Nodes), OK field controlling the node
certificated with DC, all other fields to store DC’s information. Where, all attributes (except
OK field) are updated directly by administrators to ensure that only “friendly” nodes are
provided with DC.
Table 3. Digital certificates databases
Node OK Ver Ser Num Sig Alg Iss Nam Val Per S Nam P Key Cer Sig
IPN1 yes 1 001 SHA1, RSA IPNCA T1, T2 IPN1 kN1+ CSN1
IPN2 no 1 002 SHA1, RSA IPNCA T1, T2 IPN2 kN2+ CSN2
IPN3 yes 1 003 SHA1, RSA IPNCA T1, T2 IPN3 kN3+ CSN3
IPN4 yes 1 004 SHA1, RSA IPNCA T1, T2 IPN4 kN4+ CSN4
... ...
IPNn no 1 00n SHA1, RSA IPNCA T1, T2 IPNn kNn+ CSNn
c) Digital certificate authentication algorithm. Algorithm 1 shows steps to authenticate DC
of the packet RREQ (or RREP) when Ni node receiving the packet from preceding node Nj .
Node Ni decrypts the certificate signature field value of packet RREQ (or RREP) using the
public key (kNCA+) of certificate authorities NCA. If the value after decryption is coincident
with the hash value of all DC fields excepted CS field then DC is valid. On the contrary,
DC is invalid.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to check DC
Input: RREQ or RREP packet; Output: True if DC is valid; Else return False
1: function Boolean IsValidDC(Packet P)
2: Begin
3: val1 ← De(P.DC.CS, kNCA+);
4: val2 ← H(P.DC.AllF ields\{CS});
5: Return (val1 == val2);
6: End
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3.1.2. Actual neighbors authentication
The wormhole attacks characteristic under HM mode is that malicious nodes are hidden
from normal nodes, when receiving packets and simply forwards them to each other node
without processing packet, thus, they never appear in routing tables of neighbors [10]. See
in Figure 3(b), a wormhole node (M) under HM mode, M will forward the RREQ (or
RREP) packet to N2 without changing data of packet when it receives the packet from N1.
Hence, N2 can’t detect the malicious node M if it uses the digital certificates authentication
mechanisms. Using this authenticate method, an intermediate node which can detect and
prevent the wormhole attacks under hide mode.
Definition 1. Two nodes (Ni and Nj) are actual neighbors if they are under their trans-
mission radius. Hence, d(Ni, Nj) ≤ min(RNi, RNj), where, RNδ is maximum transmission
radius of δ node, d(Ni, Nj) is Euclidean distance between Ni and Nj nodes, according to
(2), triple (xNδ , yNδ , zNδ) is Nδ node location in coordinate system for a three-dimensional
space. (as described in article [16])
d(Ni, Nj) =
√
(xNi − xNj )2 + (yNi − yNj )2 + (zNi − zNj )2. (2)
Example 1. In Figure 3(a), both of N1 and N2 nodes are actual neighbors because of the
distance between N1 and N2 nodes less than (or equal to) minimum transmission radius of
two nodes. In Figure 3(b), a wormhole node (M) under HM mode, M will forward the RREQ
(or RREP) packet to N2 without changing data of packet when it receives the packet from
N1. Due to distance between N1 and N2 nodes larger than minimum transmission radius,
they are not the actual neighbors, N2 detects that there is a HM wormhole node appeared
on discovered route.
N1
RN1
d(N1, N2)
N2
RN2
Distance (d) R
(a) Normal
N1
RN1
d(N1, N2)
M N2
RN2
Distance (d) R Malicious node
(b) Wormhole node using HM mode
Figure 3. Actual neighbor nodes
Actual neighbors algorithm. Algorithm 2 describes authenticating an actual neighbor when
Ni receives P packet from a preceding node Nj . In order to calculate the distance between
two nodes, Nj saves the its location and radio range information into GPS and R fields of
the packet P before sending (or forwarding). In MANET, node location can’t be installed
manually due to all random mobility nodes. Our idea is using a GPS information to define
node location automatically, as described in authors [11, 16]. Notice that the actual neighbors
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authentication mechanism can be mistaken in mobility network topology at high speeds, will
show in Section 4.1. by simulation results.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to check actual neighbors
Input: P packet; Output: True if source node is actual neighbors; Else return False
1: function Boolean IsActualNeighbor(Packet P )
2: Begin
3: GPS g = getGPS(); //Ni location
4: double d = Distance(P.GPS, g);
5: Return (d 6 min(P.R,RNi));
6: End
3.1.3. Packet integrity authentication
A malicious node can pass digital certificates and actual neighbors authentications mech-
anisms if it uses a fake RREQ (or RREP) packet with suitable GPS value, a valid digital
certificate of another node and a fake private key (k-) to encrypt the packet. To detect a
malicious node used the fake private key, our solution is testing the received packet, if the
packets is not integrity then the preceding node ’s private key is not fit to DC’s public key.
Thus, node (Ni) detects and prevents a malicious node joining to the discovered route by
deliberately giving a fake key.
This authentication scheme is described as follows: Source node NS hashes all fields
needed protection of control route packets RREQ (or RREP) using H function. Continu-
ously, it encrypts the hashed value using its private key as (3) and saves into field named
CV of the packets before sending this packet
P.CV ← En(H(P.AllF ields\{CV }), kNs−). (3)
When receiving the packet RREQ (or RREP) from preceding node Nj , intermediate
node Ni uses the Nj ’s public key (DCNj .PK) to decrypt the VC field value and saves to
val1 variable. All fields needed protection of the received packets are hashed by H function.
If value hash equal the variable val1 value then packets is integrity; Else, packet is not
integrity due to the fact that there exits a field needed protection of P packet is changed,
see in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to check the packet integrity
Input: RREQ or RREP packet; DCNS .PK is the NS ’s public key
Output: True if RREQ (or RREP) packet is integrity; else return False
1: function Boolean IsPacketIntegrity(Packet P; Public Key DCNS .PK)
2: Begin
3: val1 ← De(P.V C,DCNS .PK);
4: val2 ← H(P.AllF ields\{V C});
5: Return (val1 == val2);
6: End
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3.2. Improved TAMAN routing protocol
An algorithm has been designed based on reactive routing protocols accepted as standards
for routing in MANETs such as AODV. The AODV uses the route exploration mechanism if
it is necessary. If source node NS has not a route to destination node ND then source node
starts route discovery process by broadcasting the route request (RREQ) packet. AODV
protocol belongs to routing group basing on distance vector, the routing cost is therefore
calculated basing on nodes from source NS to destination ND, this is HC value in RREQ
request packet and RREP reply packet, HC value increases 1 when packet is routed by
nodes. Destination node sends unicast the reply route (RREP) packet to reply a route when
it receives RREQ packet, or the intermediate nodes can reply RREP if there exists any
“fresh” enough route to destination in routing table (RT). Each node remains SN value to
determine “fresh” of recently explored route. Basing on HC value and destination sequence
number (DSN), source node NS updates new route that newly explored route is “fresh”
enough and cheapest to destination.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Type JRGDU Reserved Hop Count| | |
ID Broadcast
Destination IP Address
Destination Sequence Number
Source IP Address
Source Sequence Number
Location (GPS)
Radio range (R)
Digital Certification (DC)
Checking Value (CV)
RREQ
(a) SeRQ
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Type |RA| Reserved | Hop Count|Pre Sz
Destination IP Address
Destination Sequence Number
Source IP Address
Life time
Location (GPS)
Radio range (R)
Digital Certification (DC)
Checking Value (CV)
RREP
(b) SeRP
Figure 4. The structures of control packets of TAMAN
The TAMAN protocol which is proposed by integration of TAM into AODV protocol
includes the two phases: Broadcasting route request packet and unicasting route reply packet.
We use the route control packets as in AODV and modify them to satisfy our requirements.
For example, the SeRQ packet is used for route discovery and the SeRP packet is used for
route reply. While most fields stay as they were in AODV, in addition, we define four new
fields (4NF) named GPS, R, DC, and CV showed in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). The GPS and R
fields are used to authenticate actual neighbors, DC field is used to authenticate the digital
certificate, and CV field to check the packet integrity as described in section 3.1.3.
3.2.1. Broadcasting SeRQ phase
TAMAN protocol discovers a new route by broadcasting SeRQ packet, is improved from
algorithm broadcasting RREQ packet of AODV, the detail as follows.
a) Generating SeRQ packet. If source node (NS) has not a route to destination node, it starts
route discovery process by broadcasting the SeRQ packet to its all neighbors as description
in (4). Where RREQ∗ is the original RREQ packet, its values are initialized as AODV
protocol and 4NF fields to store source node information including:
SeRQ.GPS = GPSNS ; SeRQ.R = 250m; SeRQ.DC = DCNS ;
SeRQ.CV = En(H(SeRQ.AllF ields\{CV }), kNS−);
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NSbroadcasts : SeRQ← {RREQ∗ + 4NF}. (4)
b) Receiving and processing the SeRQ packet. Figure 5(a) shows the algorithm for receiving
and processing the SeRQ packet. When an intermediate or destination node (Ni) receives a
SeRQ packet from a preceding node (Nj), Ni drops the packet if it has not the DC. Else, if
Ni had received the SeRQ packet (using source address and broadcast id) then drops SeRQ
and The end; Else, Ni inserts triple source address and broadcast id information into its
Cache; Continuously, Ni uses TAM to check Nj with digital certificate, actual neighbors and
packet integrity authentications using the SeRQ’s information as follows:
• If DC is invalid by calling IsValidDC(SeRQ) function Then preceding node is mali-
cious node under impersonation attack types, such as: Blackhole, Sinkhole, Grayhole,
Flooding, Whirlwind, and PM Wormhole attacks; Ni drops the SeRQ packet; and The
End;
• If SeRQ packet is not sent from an actual neighbor node by calling IsActualNeigh-
bor(SeRQ) function Then Ni drops the SeRQ packet due to preceding node is wormhole
node using HM mode; and The End;
• If SeRQ packet is not integrity by calling IsPacketIntegrity(SeRQ, SeRQ.DC.PK) func-
tion Then Nj is malicious node which used the fake keys to attack; and The End;
If all the conditions are satisfied, preceding node is normal, Ni sets up a reverse path
to the source (or updates exiting route if new route has better cost than old route) us-
ing the previous hop of the SeRQ as the next hop on the reverse path. In addition, if
there is a valid route available for the destination or current node is the destination, Ni
unicasts a SeRP back to the source via the reverse path; otherwise, it updates 4NF of
the SeRQ packet using its information before rebroadcasting the SeRQ packet to all neigh-
bors, including: SeRQ.GPS = GPSNi ;SeRQ.R = 250m;SeRQ.DC = DCNi ;SeRQ.CV =
En(H(SeRQ.AllF ields\{CV }), kNi−);
3.2.2. Unicasting SeRP phase
TAMAN uses the route reply algorithm which is improved from route reply algorithm of
AODV protocol, the detail as follows:
a) Generating SeRP packet. A node generates a SeRP packet if it is either the des-
tination (ND) or an intermediate (Ni) which has “fresh” route to the destination as de-
scription in (5). Where RREP ∗ is the original RREP packet, its values are initialized
as AODV protocol and 4NF fields to store destination (or intermediate) node informa-
tion including: SeRP.GPS = GPSND ;SeRP.R = 250m;SeRP.DC = DCND ;SeRP.CV =
En(H(SeRP.AllF ields\{CV }), kND−);
ND(or Ni)unicasts : SeRP ← {RREP ∗ + 4NF}. (5)
b) Processing and forwarding SeRP packet. Figure 5(b) shows the process for processing and
forwarding the SeRP packet. When an intermediate or source node (Ni) receives a SeRP
A NOVEL ALGORITHM BASED ON TRUST AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 367
Begin
The end
Source node (NS)
In
te
r
m
e
d
ia
te
/
d
e
st
in
a
ti
o
n
n
o
d
e
(N
i
)
Creates a SeRQ packet;
Sets GPS, R, DC and CV values;
Broadcasts SeRQ;
Uses TAM to check SeRQ: Digital certificates,
actual neighbors and packet integrity
Broadcasts
SeRQ
Dispose(SeRQ)
yes
no Preceding node
is normal
Adds a reverse route to source or
updates if better than existing route
Updates:
GPS, R,
DC, and CVDestination
fresh route to
Has a no
Generate and Send
SeRP packet
yes
no
I’m destination
yes
(a) Processing SeRQ packet
Begin
The end
Destination
node (ND)
In
te
r
m
e
d
ia
te
/
so
u
r
c
e
n
o
d
e
(N
i
)
Creates a SeRP packet;
Sets GPS, R, DC and CV values;
Unicasts SeRP;
Uses TAM to check SeRP: Digital certificates,
actual neighbors and packet integrity
Forwards
SeRP
Dispose(SeRP)
yes
no Preceding node
is normal
Adds a route to destination or
updates if better than existing route
Updates:
GPS, R,
DC and CVin its RT
entry to source
Finds an foundnot found
Sends data packets
from queue
no
I’m source
yes
(b) Processing SeRP packet
Figure 5. Improved route discovery algorithm of TAMAN
packet from a preceding node (Nj), Ni drops the packet if it has not the DC, else, Ni uses
TAM to checkNj with digital certificate, actual neighbors and packet integrity authentications
using the SeRP’s information as follows:
• If DC is invalid by using IsValidDC(SeRP) function Then preceding node is mali-
cious node under impersonation attack types, such as: Blackhole, Sinkhole, Grayhole,
Flooding, Whirlwind, and PM Wormhole attacks; Ni drops the SeRP packet; and The
End;
• If SeRP packet is not sent from a actual neighbor node by calling IsActualNeigh-
bor(SeRP) function Then Ni drops the SeRP packet due to preceding node is wormhole
node using HM mode; and The End;
• If SeRP packet is’nt integrity by calling IsPacketIntegrity(SeRP, SeRP.DC.PK) func-
tion Then Nj is malicious node which used the fake keys to attack; and The End;
If all the conditions are satisfied, preceding node is normal, Ni sets up a path to the
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destination (or updates existing route if new route has better cost than old route) using the
previous hop of the RREP as the next hop on the path. In addition, if current node is the
source node then it just simply accepts the SeRP packet to add a new route, discovering
a new route is successful, Ni sends data packets from queue; otherwise, it updates 4NF
of the SeRP packet using its information before continuously forwarding the SeRP packet
to source via next hop of entry found in RT, including: SeRP.GPS = GPSNi ;SeRP.R =
250m;SeRP.DC = DCNi ;SeRP.CV = En(H(SeRP.AllF ields\{CV }), kNi−);
3.3. Features and security performance analysis
A comparison of the various features and security mechanisms was carried out and the
results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
3.3.1. Features analysis
We compare features of the TAMAN and related works, a comparison summary is pro-
vided in Table 4. Both of ARAN and TAMAN protocols support hop-by-hop authentica-
tion mechanism, SAODV uses end-to-end authentication mechanism. TAMAN has preced-
ing node authentication with its DC unlike ARAN that it uses DS, SAODV authenticate
source node with DS. SAODV uses hash function to prevent the decrement of the hop count
field value while TAMAN using packet intergrity authentication mechanism. TAMAN and
SAODV protocols use HC as the parameter to determine routing cost, but ARAN does not
support HC field. TAMAN and SAODV protocols support a route reply at intermediate
nodes except for ARAN (See in [7], Table 2). Moreover, TAMAN protocol has a “friendly”
nodes management mechanism by providing DC based on X509 using reliable node NCA.
TAMAN protocol has packet intergrity authentication mechanism while both of SAODV
and ARAN only can be protection mutable fields. Specially, TAMAN supports an actual
neighbors authentication mechanism to detect hide mode wormhole attacks.
Table 4. The features of TAMAN and related works
Features
Protocols
SAODV ARAN TAMAN
End to end authentication • •
Hop by hop authentication • •
Source address authentication with DS •
Preceding node authentication with DS •
Preceding node authentication with its DC •
HC is used to define metrics route • •
Intermediate nodes reply the route • •
Supports public key management • •
Mutable fields protection with DS • •
Packet integrity protection with DS •
Actual neighbors authentication using GPS •
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3.3.2. Security performance analysis
The security performance of TAMAN protocol is compared with older protocols, a com-
parison summary is provided in Table 5.
Table 5. Comparison between TAMAN and related works
Prevention
Protocols
SAODV ARAN TAMAN
Blackhole/ Sinkhole attacks • • •
Grayhole attacks • • •
Flooding attacks • • •
Whirlwind attacks • • •
Wormhole attacks:
- Hidden Mode (HM) •
- Participation Mode (PM) • • •
Using the fake keys • •
a) Detection and prevention of impersonation attacks. To attack AODV routing protocol
under Blackhole/ Sinkhole, Grayhole and Whirlwind types, a malicious node uses the vul-
nerabilities of the route reply packets of the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the
shortest path to the destination node. When the malicious node receives an RREQ packet,
it immediately sends a fake route reply packet (FRREP) giving a route to destination over
itself. In Figure 6(a), source node (N1) discovers a new route to destination node (N5) by
broadcasting RREQ packet and receiving RREP packet from N5. The result is that source
node discovers a best route to N5 on direction {N1 → N2 → N3 → N4 → N5}. However,
if there exists a malicious node M in the network, source node discovers a new route to
destination through malicious node M due to M pretends that it has the best route to N5
by replying FRREP packet. TAMAN can detect and prevent all of impersonation attacks
by checking the route reply packet, this is described in Figure 6(b). When a malicious node
M sends a fake SeRP packet to node N3, this latter rejects the packet since the DC of M
is not valid. Hence, source N1 will not establish a route through M and data packets don’t
send to malicious node.
N1
Source
N2 N3 N4 N5
Destination
M
RREQ
RREP
FRREP
(a) AODV
N1
Source
N2 N3 N4 N5
Destination
M
SeRQ
SeRP
FSeRP
(b) TAMAN
Figure 6. Description of impersonation attacks detection
b) Detection and prevention of flooding attacks. Flooding attack [27] is one of the main
challenges in the security of MANET. It is implemented by overwhelmingly sending control
route packets from malicious nodes to unavailable destinations. The result is a broadcasting
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storm of packets and increasing communication overhead, which reduce the responsiveness
at each node because of its unnecessary processing. Figure 7(a), RREQ flooding attacks
effect all nodes by broadcasting request route packets. TAMAN can detect and prevent this
attack form by checking the route request packet, this is described in Figure 7(b). When a
malicious node M sends a fake SeRQ packet to its all neighbors named N1, N3 and N5, this
latter rejects the packet since the DC of M is not valid.
N1
N2 N3 N4
N5M
RREQ
RREQ RREQ
RREQ
RREQ
(a) AODV
N1
N2 N3 N4
N5M
SeRQ
SeRQ
SeRQ
(b) TAMAN
Figure 7. Description of flooding attacks detection
c) Detection and prevention of wormhole attacks. For purpose of attack, the attackers use
the two malicious nodes connected with each other by a tunnel that is aimed at eavesdropping
or damaging the data packet. In Figure 8(a), source node N1 requests the route to destination
N5 by broadcasting RREQ via 2 routes {N1 → N2 → N3 → N4 → N5} and {N1 → M1 →
M2 → N5}. Source node accepts the second route which has two malicious nodes M1 and
M2 because it has the low routing cost. Wormhole attacks use two modes of attacks, such
as HM and PM modes [10]. A malicious node under PM mode processes SeRQ and SeRP
packets as other normal nodes. Thus, a normal node can detect an abnormal preceding node
if it is a PM wormhole node by using the DC authentication mechanism.
Source Destination
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
M1 M2
RREQ RREP Tunnel
(a) AODV
Source Destination
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
M1 M2
SeRQ SeRP Tunnel
(b) TAMAN
Figure 8. Description of wormhole detection
See in Figure 8(b), when a malicious node M2 sends a SeRQ packet to node N5, this latter
rejects the packet since the DC of M2 is not valid. For HM mode wormhole attacks case,
malicious nodes are hidden from normal nodes, when receive packets and simply forwards
them to each other without processing packet. In ARAN, each intermediate node replaces
the signature of the preceding node with its own signature. A malicious node can see this
weakness and forwards the route control packets without replacing the signature similarly
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to HM womhole attack type. Thus, ARAN can fail to detect this attack type because the
signature appears to be a valid signature [12]. However, TAMAN can detect and prevent
malicious nodes by using actual neighbors authentication. In Figure 8(b), when a malicious
node M2 sends a SeRQ packet to node N5, this latter rejects the packet since distance
between N1 and N5 is larger than transmission range R.
d) Detection and prevention of using fake keys. Malicious nodes try collaborate to the dis-
covered route by deliberately giving fake information concerning through fake control route
packets. They can pass digital certificates and actual neighbors authentications mechanisms
if it uses a fake RREQ (or RREP) packet using suitable GPS value, a valid digital certifi-
cate of other normal node and a fake private key (k-) to encrypt the packet before sending.
However, TAMAN can detect a malicious node used the fake private key based on packet
integrity authentication mechanism due to malicious node ’s private key is not fit to DC’s
public key. Moreover, a malicious node can not join to the discovered route by deliberately
giving fake public key (k+) due to the public key is a part of the digital certificates.
4. EVALUATE THE RESULT OF SIMULATION
We evaluate the performance of TAMAN and related protocols using NS2 version 2.35
[1, 6]. The simulation area was a rectangular region with a size of 2000 × 2000 m2, which
was chosen to ensure that there existed multiple hops within the network as Figure 9.
Figure 9. Network topology for simulation, 20UDP connections
We use a 802.11 MAC layer, there are 100 normal mobile nodes used for simulation in
network topology, maximum total of 40 pairs of communicating nodes with the source nodes
in blue and destination nodes in red. The first data source is started at second of 0, the
following data source is 5 seconds apart from each node. Each source sending out constant
bit rate (CBR) traffic with packet sizes of 512bytes at a rate of 2 packets per second. FIFO
queue type, 1000 seconds for simulation times, the maximum radio range of node (R) is
250m, the detail of basic simulation parameters are listed in the following Table 6.
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Table 6. Simulation parameters
Parameters Setting
Simulation area 2000 × 2000 (m2)
Simulation times 1000 (s)
Normal nodes 100 (node)
Transmission range 250 (m)
Transport protocol UDP
Traffic type CBR
Data rate 2 packets per second
Packet size 512 bytes
Queue type FIFO (DropTail)
Routing protocols AODV, SAODV, ARAN and TAMAN
Hash function (H) SHA1
We evaluate detection performance and compare related protocols, using some metrics:
Hide mode wormhole attacks detection performance, detection performance of malicious
nodes using fake key, packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, and routing load, using (6),
(7), and (8) equations:
• Packet delivery ratio (PDR) is calculated by formula (6). The ratio of the received
packets by the destination nodes to the packets sent by the source node
PDR =
∑n
i=1DATA
recieved
i∑m
j=1DATA
sent
j
∗ 100%. (6)
• End-to-end delay (ETE) is calculated by formula (7). This is the average delay between
the sending of the data packet by the CBR source and its receipt at the corresponding
CBR receiver
ETE =
∑n
i=1 T
i
DATA
n
. (7)
• Routing load (RL) is calculated by formula (8). This is the ratio of overhead control
packets sent (or forwarded) to successfully delivered data packet
RL =
∑m
j=1 PACKET
overhead
j∑n
i=1DATA
recieved
i
. (8)
4.1. Malicious nodes detection performances
The first, we evaluate wormhole detection performance under HM mode for proposed
TAM, based on two metrics tunnel length and mobility speed. There are 16 scenarios for
simulation, each scenario uses 10UDP connections, 100 normal mobile nodes and 2 mali-
cious nodes, all nodes move randomly with maximum speeds (MS) are 0, 10, 20 and 30m/s
(0m/s ∼ immobility) in random way point [28] model, two malicious nodes behavior is eaves-
dropping, are stayed at the center position with hops tunnel length (TL) is 1, 2, 3, and 4
hops (250m/1hop). Because wormhole nodes under HM mode, malicious nodes are hidden
from normal nodes, when receiving packets and simply forward them to each other without
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processing packet, thus, they can’t be detected by DC and packet integrity authentications.
Using the actual neighbors authentication, normal node can detect the SeRQ (or SeRP)
packet is forwarded by HM wormhole nodes. However, the weakness of the actual neigh-
bors authentication is it uses location based on GPS information, thus, this method can be
mistaken in mobility network topology at high speeds. Simulation results in Figure 10(a)
show that TAM has the successful detection ratio above 99% (the mistaken rate below 1.0%)
of hide mode wormhole nodes for all mobility scenarios with 30m/s maximum speeds and
1hop minimum tunnel length, this ratio is 100% for all used immobile scenarios based tunnel
length.
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Figure 10. Detection performance of malicious nodes
The second, we use 4 scenarios for simulation to evaluate detection performance of ma-
licious node using fake key based on the number of UDP connections. Each scenario has
100 normal mobile nodes and 1 malicious node staying at the center position for simulation.
All of normal nodes move randomly with maximum speeds 30m/s. Traffic conditions range
from light to heavy and are represented by the number of UDP network connections (NCs)
between source- destination node pairs from 10 for light traffic to 40 for heavy traffic. Other
parameters remain the same as described in Table 6. Simulation results in Figure 10(b) show
that TAM has successful detection ratio of 100% of malicious nodes using fake key for all
scenarios.
4.2. Comparision of TAMAN and related works under Blackhole attacks
Continuously, we evaluate blackhole attacks detection performance of proposed TAMAN
and related works. Each scenario has 100 normal mobile nodes and 1 malicious node. The
intruder stays at the center position and starts to attack at 500s, other parameters remain the
same as described in Table 6. In the blackhole attack, a malicious node exploits the routing
protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose data packets it wants
to intercept. In AODV case, a malicious node replies to source node by fake RREP (FRREP)
packet with the best route to destination. By doing that, the blackhole node successfully
gains traffic flow from source transfer to destination. As a result, the sources node sends all
of data packets to the attack node which can drop the packets. In security protocols case,
malicious node uses fake keys to sign FRREP packet before it replies to source node.
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Figure 11. Performance of TAMAN and related works under blackhole attacks
The main purpose for blackhole attack is to destroy data packets, reduce packet deliv-
ery ratio. Figure 11(a) shows that packet delivery ratio of AODV and SAODV go down
significantly under blackhole attacks. After 1000s for simulation with 10UDP connections,
the AODV packet delivery ratio is 35.54% and SAODV is 34.33%. ARAN packet delivery
ratio in attacks state is 59.59% and TAMAN is 64.52% due to both of them can detect and
prevent the blackhole attacks efficiently. It is then clear that the TAMAN packet delivery
ratio is improved significantly and has better packet delivery ratio compared to SAODV and
ARAN. Figure 11(b) shows that all security protocols have end-to-end delay higher than
AODV because they used RSA public key encryption and hash function SHA1 for security
goal. After 1000s for simulation, end-to-end delay of TAMAN is 1.541s, SAODV is 1.931s,
ARAN is 1.235s and AODV is 0.927s. Figure 11(c) shows that TAMAN routing load is
18.93pkt, SAODV is 22.33pkt, ARAN is 19.25pkt and AODV is 20.73pkt. Thus, the end-to-
end delay increases and the routing load decreases in our scheme as compared to the scenario
under the blackhole attack.
4.3. Comparision of TAMAN and related works in normal scenarios
Finally, we evaluate the harm of proposed security solutions to the original protocol
performance in normal network topology. A security mechanism that integrates into the
original routing protocols will affect the performance of the routing protocol (based on PDR
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main parameter) of the original protocol. Thus, a good solution also minimizes the impact
on the original protocol. We use 4 scenarios for simulation with 10UDP connections, 100
normal nodes, all of nodes move randomly with maximum speeds 30m/s, other parameters
remain the same as described in Table 6.
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Figure 12. Performance of TAMAN and related works using normal scenario
The simulation results in normal network topology in Figure 12 show that all security
solutions harmed the original protocol performance. Packet delivery ratio is reduced, average
end-to-end delay and routing load are increased. After 1000s for simulation, Figure 12(a)
shows that packet delvery ratio of TAMAN is 65.03% (reduced 6.01%), SAODV is 62.91%
(reduced 8.13%) and ARAN is 60.22% (reduced 10.82%) when compared to AODV. Figure
12(b) shows that en-to-end delay of TAMAN is 1.394s (increased 0.467s), SAODV is 1.81s
(increased 0.883s) and ARAN is 1.188s (increased 0.261s) when compared to AODV. Figure
12(c) shows that routing load of TAMAN is 18.58pkt (increased 1.6pkt), SAODV is 17.17pkt
(increased 0.19pkt) and ARAN is 18.81pkt (increased 1.83pkt) when compared to AODV.
The simulation results in Figure 11(a) and Figure 12(a) confirm that TAMAN outperformed
SAODV and ARAN for high mobility speed simulation scenarios under normal and blackhole
attacks.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the TAM mechanisms to check preceding node through authenticating hop-
by-hop all route control packets with three steps: (1) Digital certificates; (2) actual neighbors;
and (3) packet integrity. A new protocol named TAMAN, is improved from AODV protocol
which can prevent almost of network attack types, such as Blackhole/ Sinkhole, Grayhole,
Flooding and Whirlwind attacks. Simulation results confirm that TAMAN has successful
HM wormhole attacks detection ratio above 99% (the mistaken rate below 1.0%) for all mo-
bility scenarios at 30m/s maximum speed and 1hop minimum tunnel length, and successful
detection rate to 100% for immobile scenario. In addtion, TAMAN can detect and prevent
the malicious nodes joining the network by using the fake key with successful detection ratio
of 100% for all scenarios based on the number of UDP connections. Moreover, TAMAN
packet delivery ratio is outperformed SAODV and ARAN for all simulation scenarios under
normal and blackhole attacks. However, because of using TAM for security goal, TAMAN
has lower performance in terms of packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay and routing load,
compared to AODV in normal scenarios.
In the future, we will improve TAMAN by adding a provider the DC for all nodes
automatically through the DCP and DCACK packets. And using large key based on TLS
library [23], to improve TAMAN security performance.
APPENDIX
OUPUT:
X2X3X4........................................................................Xn−1Xn
Encryption (val) = X1 ← b is changed to Hexadecimal
b ← aemodN (or b ← admodN)
INPUT: msg = Message
a ← D6 is changed to Decimal
val = SHA1(msg) = D6 62 39 0E 19 9C E3 A5 DF 14 4F B4 4D BD 33 85 1B 53 4D 04
(a) Encryption
OUPUT:
INPUT: msg = X1X2X3X4.........................................................................Xn−1Xn
Decryption (msg) = D6 ← b is changed to Hexadecimal
b ← admodN (or b ← aemodN)
a ← X1 is changed to Decimal
62 39 0E 19 9C E3 A5 DF 14 4F B4 4D BD 33 85 1B 53 4D 04
(b) Decryption
Figure 13. Encryption and decryption algorithms using a key (e, d,N)
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